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COMMENTS
Also, that certain coverage is required should not preclude maintaining optional
forms of insurance. To encourage this, accounting for collateral sources would
only be required in the specified compulsory forms of coverage. Even if these
ideas do not alleviate court congestion and some of the fraudulent claims that
cause the congestion, it does not seem extravagant to suggest the addition of one
or two members to the local bench. The proper interest should not be economy,
but rather a fair and appropriate system of compensating loss.
VII. Co cusIoN
The Keeton-O'Connell proposal goes too far in certain aspects and not
far enough in others. Their complicated system of exclusions and deductions
leaves them open to justifiable criticism. Their concern for the injured pedestrian
is laudable, but, because of this concern, their program was challenged as an
added inducement for fraudulent claims. The concept of "net economic loss"
lends itself to the interpretation that "basic protection" was no protection at all.
Retaining contributory fault principles to handle liability claims over
certain limits in the face of their severe criticism of the fault system was simply
inconsistent. Moreover, Keeton and O'Connell were content to provide for
voluntary liability insurance to cover judgments over the basic protection
amounts. Disparaging of fault, they would have permitted compensation for
personal irresponsibility. Perhaps these inconsistencies arose because of the
authors' concern for the "practical politics" of obtaining acceptance for such a
proposal. If this is so, it is ironic that this practical aspect is the underlying cause
for the criticism levied against their plan.
Certainly there is much that can be said in favor of the Keeton-O'Connell
proposal, but in its present form it is not the answer. What this proposal has
accomplished is to vitalize the dialogue attempting to remedy the flaws in the
present system. This is a valuable achievement in itself. Hopefully the end
product of the debate will be a fair and workable plan to compensate loss in the
automobile accident area. RoBERT B. CONKLIN
TITLE TO GOODS: THE POSITION OF THE PURCHASER AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Under common law, the bona fide purchaser long received dichotomous
treatment from commercial law. Some complained that the bona fide purchaser
was being protected to the detriment of merchants, while others argued that
the protection afforded the bona fide purchaser should be increased to promote
the free transfer of goods.1 The fact that these arguments were often couched
1. See Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting
Analysis, 1 Hastings L.J. 111, 121 (1949). He refers to the treatment of bona fide purchasers
as being "Janus-faced."
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in abstract legal terms, such as voidable title, apparent authority and conditional
sale, with little attention being paid to current economic and social conditions,
led to the result that the law in this area was generally inconsistent and in-
congruous.
Recently, there has been a statutory effort to crystallize and update the
law concerning the protection of a bona fide purchaser through the enactment
of Uniform Commercial Code 2-403 [hereinafter referred to as UCC or Code],
which treats disputes between owners and purchasers over the title to goods.2
In order to assess the changes made by the UCC in this area, and the impact
these changes have had, the Code must first be examined in the context of the
common law.3
THE Co MoN LAW
General Rule
Under common law,. no one could convey a better title to goods than he
had.4 As a result, the owner of goods usually could recover them from a
purchaser who received such goods from a fraudulent transferor. This common
law rule was based on two premises. First, it was designed to insure the solvency
of owner-merchants by assuring that they received value for their goods and
were not divested of them by a purchaser who took from a fraudulent transferor.5
Secondly, the rule followed from the common law determination that purchasers
should assure themselves of their vendor's title and, since their failure to do so
made the fraudulent transfer possible, they should bear the loss caused by that
transfer.6
Bona Fide Purchasers
The common law provided an exception to the rule that no one could
convey a better title to goods than he had in instances wherein it was clear that
the owner was responsible for allowing the fraudulent transferor to cause the
loss. The theories of voidable title and estoppel implemented this exception, and
in order to be protected the purchaser had to bring himself within one of them.
2. Throughout this comment, the terms owner, transferor and purchaser will be used
to refer to the parties involved. Owner refers to the person originally having title to the
goods; see Powell v. Home Indemnity Co., 343 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1965); Coyle v. Swanson,
- Mass. -, 185 NYE.2d 906 (1962). Transferor refers to the middleman who obtains the
goods from the owner and conveys them to the purchaser: see Credit Bureau of San Diego
v. Wolf, 93 Cal. App. 2d 761, 209 P.2d 828 (1949); Corning Glass Works v. Max Dichter
Co., 102 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569 (1960). Purchaser refers to the person who obtains the
goods from the transferor; see Giustina v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 303 (D.C. Ore.
1960); Pearson v. Allied Fin. Co., 336 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1963).
3. The UCC is presently in force in every state except Louisiana. However, it is only
uniform to the extent that it displaces the common law, which varied greatly from state
to state.
4. See Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 332 (1882); R. Benjamin, Sale of Per-
sonal Property 11 (7th ed. 1889); J. Jones, Bona Fide Purchase of Goods 4 (1921).
5. 3. Jones, supra note 4, at 4.
6. Id. at 49-50; L. Void, Law of Sales 173-75 (2d ed. 1959).
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For either theory to apply, however, the buyer first had to establish that he
was a bona fide purchaser. A bona fide purchaser was generally defined by the
common law as one who (1) in good faith (2) purchased goods (3) for value
(4) in the ordinary course of business (5) without knowledge that his purchase
was in violation of the rights of a third party in the goods.7 To understand the
operation of the common law in this area, it is necessary to examine each re-
quirement of this definition in some depth.
The first requirement of good faith was roughly equivalent to honesty, but
definitive legal standards were lacking. If the purchaser was a merchant, courts
referred to trade practices as establishing the good faith standard. 8 However,
there were no such standards applicable to non-merchant purchasers. Courts
said that negligence alone did not show bad faith, but this principle was qualified
by the fact that most courts held the purchaser to a standard of reasonable care
in ascertaining the adequacy of his transferor's title: 9 if he were negligent in
checking on his transferor's title, he was often found to have constructive notice
of his transferor's defective title.'L Of course any evidence of collusion between
the transferor and purchaser established bad faith."
Secondly, the requirement of a purchase excluded taking by devise, which
was usually covered by Wills Acts and property law.12 Goods included any
tangible that could be transferred in a commercial transaction.'3 As a general
rule, certain intangibles such as accounts and contract rights fell within this
concept,14 but it did not include negotiable instruments and security instru-
ments.' 5 While a holder in due course differed from a bona fide purchaser,
courts usually applied the definition of a bona fide purchaser to transactions
dealing with the assignment of chattel mortgage agreements. 16
The next concept, value, was synonomous with sufficient consideration.
17
Thus, under common law doctrine, a purchaser who bought a television set
7. See, e.g., Frankish v. Federal Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 700, 87 P.2d 90 (1939);
Fane Dev. Co. v. Townsend, 381 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1963); Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354
(1958); J. Jones, supra note 3, at 14-30.
8. Cf. Finance Guaranty Co. v. Defiance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 125 A. 585
(1924).
9. This rule was usually limited to situations where the exercise of reasonable care
would have led to discovery of the transferor's defective title. See American Surety Co.
v. 1st Nat'l Bank in W. Union, 50 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.W.Va. 1943); Orso v. Cater, 272 Ala.
657, 133 So. 2d 864 (1961); Henschke v. Christian, 228 Minn. 142, 36 N.W.2d 547 (1949);
but see Whayne v. Seamans, 95 Okla. 168, 217 P. 859 (1923).
10. See, e.g., University of Richmond v. Stone, 148 Va. 686, 139 S.E. 257 (1927).
11. See Davidson v. Corner, 254 Ala. 38, 46 So. 2d 832 (1950); C. Jon Dev. Corp. v.
Pond-Porsche Corp., 69 Il1. App. 469, 217 N.E.2d 416 (1966).
12. Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 91, 267 P.2d 730, 733 (1954).
13. Jones, supra note 4, at 9-13.
14. Cf. 1st Nat'l Bank of Ottawa v. Kay Bee Co., 366 III. 202, 7 N.E.2d 860 (1937).
15. See Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220 A.2d 621
(1966); see also 2 S. Williston, Sales 606 (rev. ed. 1948).
16. See, e.g., Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 101 Ga. App. 595, 115 S.E.2d 218
(1960).
17. See Ross v. Rambo, 195 Ga. 100, 23 S.E.2d 687 (1942); J. Jones, supra note 4,
at 25-29.
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stituted value.' 8 Courts normally did not determine the adequacy of the value
by measuring it against the worth of the goods obtained, but would set aside
a conveyance if the value was so grossly inadequate as to put a reasonable person
on notice that the transaction was fraudulent.19
Fourth, the requirement that the transaction be in the ordinary course
of business served to withhold protection from a purchaser in situations where
he should reasonably have been on notice that the transaction was fraudulent.
Thus, under the common law doctrine, a purchaser who bought a television set
from an automobile dealer would not take in the ordinary course, nor would
a person buying at a foreclosure or judicial sale.2 0 However, one buying from a
dealer in those goods or a seller with whom he has had prior dealings of the same
type was presumed to have taken in the ordinary course.2'
Finally, the requirement of lack of knowledge of defective title caused the
courts, as well as purchasers, considerable difficulty. Most courts agreed that
the burden was on the purchaser to demonstrate that he took without knowl-
edge.22 There was much dispute over whether knowledge was equivalent to
notice and, if so, whether the concept of constructive notice should be ap-
plicable to the definition of a bona fide purchaser.238 Traditionally, in this area
of judicial interpretation, courts have been hostile toward using the concept of
constructive notice.24 If the doctrine of constructive notice is not applied in this
area, there is no problem in holding, as most courts have, that knowledge is
synonomous with notice.25 This body of law was further confounded by the fact
that some courts, which used the concept of notice, held that lack of notice
meant more than mere absence of knowledge.20 This construction appears to
indirectly bring the concept of constructive notice into the definition.
18. Clark v. Bowell, 163 Misc. 777, 298 N.Y.S. 232 (Co. Ct. 1937); but cf. Van
Cleve v. Meyers, 108 N.J. Eq. 421, 155 A. 482 (1931).
19. Rabbit v. Atkinson, 44 Cal. App. 2d 706, 113 P.2d 14 (1941); Dennis v. Smith,
196 Kan. 539, 352 P.2d 405 (1960); cf. Helena & Livingston S. & R.R. v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
62 Mont. 281, 205 P. 224 (1922).
20. Johnson v. 1st Nat'l Bank of Otis, 108 Colo. 188, 115 P.2d 56 (1941) ; Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Vogt, 165 Neb. 611, 86 N.W.2d 771 (1957); cf. Jarney v. Bell, 111
F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940) (trustee in bankruptcy); Vandin v. Henry McCleary Timber Co.,
157 Wash. 635, 289 P. 1016 (1930) (execution creditor).
21. Cf. Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953); see
text at infra note 56 for the UCC codification of this principle.
22. See, e.g., Mori v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 3 I1. App. 2d 49, 120 N.E.2d 567 (1954);
Sterling Nat'l B. & T. Co. v. Brigante-Bernhardt Buick, 201 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct.
1960) ; but cf. Starr Piano Co. v. Baker, 8 Ala. 449, 62 So. 549 (1913) (Burden is on
purchaser to establish everything but lack of knowledge).
23. Compare Walden v. Downing Co., 4 Ga. App. 534, 61 S.E. 1127 (1908), willt
Davis v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 54, 100 P.2d 996 (1940).
24. See United States v. Spring State Bank, 150 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Wis. 1957); cf.
Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 122 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1941); but cf. Holford v. Patterson,
113 Tex. 410, 257 S.W. 213 (1923).
25. No matter which term was used, the result was the same. See, e.g., Castner v.
Ziemer, 125 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1960); Shephard v. Van Doren, 30 Cal. App. 700, 87 P.2d
90 (1936); Condilla v. Bondy, 353 Pa. 249, 44 A.2d 586 (1946).
26. Dreyer v. Kicklighter, 228 F. 744 (S.D. Ga. 1916); cf. Bunne v. Petterman, 52
N.M. 284, 197 P.2d 618 (1948).
COMMENTS
There was also much confusion in the common law concerning what stan-
dard of knowledge to apply. The median standard was one of "reasonable dili-
gence." 27 Thus, willful abstinence from inquiry constituted presumptive notice,
and in instances of actual notice, such as information conveyed by the owner or
the observance by the purchaser of a recorded chattel mortgage, the owner
always prevailed.2 8 In situations other than those mentioned above, judicial
standards varied from requiring an affirmative effort by the purchaser to locate
good title in the transferor to merely a lack of actual notice.
2 9
The majority of cases involving disputes between the owner and purchaser
over the title to goods during the past half-century have concerned the fraudulent
transfer of automobiles, and Automobile Title Certificate Statutes have caused
the courts a good deal of consternation.3" These statutes were held not to
require the purchaser to search for title, but this is modified by the fact that
some courts required the purchaser to at least request a title certificate.31 When
the purchaser received a title certificate, the better reasoned cases held this to
conclusively establish lack of knowledge or notice of the transferor's defective
title.32 A further problem was created when encumbrances, such as security
interests, were noted on the title certificate or other document of title. For rather




Once the buyer had met the above standards and established himself as a
bona fide purchaser, the doctrines of voidable title and estoppel were available
to protect his title against the owner of the goods. The voidable title doctrine
held that the transaction was only voidable between the owner and the trans-
feror, and once the goods passed to a bona fide purchaser the owner's rights
were lost. 4 Voidable title is to be distinguished from void title, where the trans-
27. See Davis v. Kleindiendst, 64 Ariz. 251, 169 P.2d 78 (1946); Tybrisa Co. v.
Tybeeland, Inc., 220 Ga. 442, 139 S.E.2d 302 (1964); Ex parte Dort, 238 S.C. 506, 121
S.E.2d 1 (1961); Richlands Buick Corp. v. Hurst Hardware Co., 80 W. Va. 746, 92 SE.
685 (1917).
28. See, e.g., A.C. Nelson Auto Sales v. Turner, 241 Iowa 927, 44 N.W.2d 36 (1950);
Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, 47 NJ. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (1957); Quality Shingle
Co. v. Old Ore. Lumber & Shingle Co., 110 Wash. 60, 187 P. 705 (1920).
29. Compare United States v. Christensen, S0 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Ill. 1943) with Comm.
Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
30. These statutes required that the title certificate be transferred to the purchaser at
the time of the sale in order for the transaction to be valid. For a discussion of these
statutes, see G. Bogert, W. Britton & W. Hawkland, Cases & Materials on Sales & Security
201-11 (4th ed. 1962).
31. Cf. General Motors Acc. Corp. v. Hill, 95 Ariz. 347, 390 P.2d 843 (1964); but cf.
Lux v. Lockridge, 65 Idaho 639, 150 P.2d 127 (1944). A strong dissent in this case was one
of the first expressions of what is now the majority view.
32. See Patterson Motors Corp. v. Cortez, 2 Ariz. Rep. 798, 408 P.2d 331 (1965).
33. 1st Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Provident Fin. Co., 176 Neb. 45, 125 N.W.2d 786
(1963); but cf. Merchants Bank of N.Y. v. McKenna, 29 Misc.2d 50, 212 N.Y.S.2d 541
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1961) (Recorded chattel mortgage is notice as a matter of law.).
34. R. Benjamin, supra note 4, at 409-10; S. Williston, supra note 15, at §§ 311, 348;
cf. C. Schmithoff, The Sale of Goods 108-10 (2d ed. 1961) (Importance of distinction be-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
feror's title is void ab initio, as in the case of a thief, and a bona fide purchaser
can acquire no title to the goods. A basic premise of the doctrine of voidable title
was that it be possible to infer a contract of sale between the owner and the
transferor; thus it was critical that the owner intended to sell the goods.8'3
The requirement of intent to sell engrafted two limitations on the doctrine
of voidable title. The "cash sale" or "bad check" limitation provided that the
owner intended to sell only for cash and that no title passed to the transferor
until the cash was in the possession of the owner, and if the owner never re-
ceived cash the transferor's title was void.36 Therefore, if a check or draft was
subsequently dishonored, the transferor acquired no title and could convey none.
Recently, however, the courts have been moving away from this limitation and
holding that a transfer for a bad check confers voidable title on the transferor.31
One suggested reason for this is that in selling for a check or future payment
the owner-seller waives his right to immediate cash payment."
The other limitation on the doctrine of voidable title concerned transactions
where the bona fide purchaser took from a fraudulent transferor; although it
was never quite clear what type of fraud would render the transferor's title
void rather than voidable. The majority of courts held that title was void where
the fraud was punishable as larceny.39 The implication of this construction was
that as long as the fraud was merely tortious, rather than larcenous, the trans-
feror acquired voidable title. But, some courts went so far as to hold that no
title passed to the transferor if the fraud was simply "wrongful and surrepti-
tious." 40
A clear illustration of the fraudulent transfer limitation would be where A,
who was hopelessly insolvent, represented himself to the owner as B, a prosperous
merchant desiring to buy goods. In this situation, no title would pass to A on the
theory that the owner inteded to sell to B, the prosperous merchant. But, it is
arguable that if A, in the same circumstances, merely held himself out to be
solvent he would acquire voidable title and could freely convey the goods to a
tween voidable and void title diminishing in favor of principle that one who consents in fact
that another person shall have possession of his goods shall lose title to them if they pass
to a bona fide purchaser) ; but see UCC 2-403(2).
35. Williston, supra note 15, at §§ 311, 348; cf. Fryer v. Downard, 134 Ind. App. 225,
187 N.E.2d 105 (1963).
36. Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n., 186 Minn. 236, 243 NAy. 106 (1932); National
Bank of Comm. v. Chicago B. & E.R.R. 46 N.W. 342 (1890); cf. Port Fin. Co. v. Ber,
45 So. 2d 404 (1950) (the same result was reached under civil law doctrine of la possession
vaut titre); but cf., Hawkland, Curing Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present
and Commercial Code, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 720 (1962) (UCC reverses result in Gustafson),
37. See, e.g., J.L. McLure Motors Co. v. McLain, 341 Ala. App. 614, 42 So. 2d 266
(1949) ; Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1024, 300 N.W. 260 (1941) ; see generally
L. Vold, supra note 6, at 400-01.
38. Cf. Linton v. Citizens State Bank, 368 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1962).
39. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Malone, 105 Ga. App. 281, 134 S.E.2d 501 (1962); Amols v.
Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y.S. 518 (-Dep't 1925); but cf. Hawkland, supra note
36, at 720 (UCC also reverses Amols).
40. Panhandle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Pudey & Son, 125 Colo. 355, 243 P.2d 756 (1952).
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bona fide purchaser.41 This theory necessitates deciding whether the owner must
intend to sell to a person of a certain status or merely to a given physical being.
The sounder decisions hold that, at least in face-to-face transactions, the owner




Whether or not the bona fide purchaser brought himself within the voidable
title doctrine, he might still protect himself by invoking the doctrine of estoppel.
This doctrine rested on the notion that the person making the fraudulent transfer
possible should bear the resulting loss, and became operative in situations where
the owner had given the transferor some type of authority to dispose of the
goods.43 If the transferor had actual authority to sell the goods, the owner was
clearly estopped from asserting his title against a bona fide purchaser. 44 However,
the owner may also have been estopped by the transferor's apparent authority,
and the problematic question was what the owner must do to create this author-
ity.45
Courts were unanimous in holding that bare possession of the goods by the
transferor, unless he was a dealer in those goods, was not enough to create an
estoppel: there must have been some activity of the owner sufficient to clothe the
transferor with some indicia of title.46 This principle was grounded on the theory
that the owner must do something to mislead the purchaser into believing the
transferor has authority to sell the goods.47 Under the doctrine of estoppel,
however, there was no clear indication of what the owner must do to clothe the
transferor with some indicia of title. If it was found, even by implication, that
the owner intended the transferor to sell the goods he was usually estopped.48
41. Cf. Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 270 S.W.2d 978 (1949).
42. See Sullivan v. Larson, 49 Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 460 (1948); Kent v. Wright, 198
Okla. 103, 175 P.2d 802 (1947).
43. L. Vold, supra note 6, at 173; S. Williston, supra note 15, at §§ 312-16. In England,
the doctrine of market overt was also available to protect the bona fide purchaser. It was
based on the theory that the owner had a duty to search for his goods in the market place,
and whether the purchaser was protected usually depended on the definition of a market.
This theory was never adopted in the United States. See R. Benjamin, supra note 4, at 12;
J. Jones, supra note 4, at 33-49. As to whether the UCC adopts the theory of market overt,
see W. Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales 104-06 (1958).
44. See, e.g., Joel Strickland Enterprises v. Atlantic Discount Co., 137 So. 2d 627
(Fla. 1962). The authority, however, is-limited to the right to sell; and does not include
the right to otherwise encumber the goods, Beyer v. Noble, 81 Ga. App. 34, 57 S.E.2d 844
(1950).
45. The situation was made even more confusing by the fact that courts often used
the terms estoppel and apparent authority interchangeably. See, e.g., Western Produce Co.
v. Citizens State Bank, 113 S.W.2d 951 (1938).
46. See Forsyth Storage & Transfer, Inc. v. William E. Cramer Co., 215 Md. 93, 136
A.2d 905 (1957); Nelson v. Wolf, 4 N.J. 76, 71 A.2d 630 (1950).
47. Cf. National Resources, Inc. v. Wineberg, 349 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1010 (1966) (Cal. law); Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d
391 (1953) (decided under Pa. law).
48. See, e.g., Grasslands Water Ass'n v. Lucky Leven Land & C. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d
776, 247 P.2d 380 (1952); Finance Guaranty Co. v. Defiance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md.
94, 125 A. 585 (1924).
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An owner, who has purchased goods from the transferor, was also estopped
from contesting a conveyance by the transferor-seller to a subsequent bona fide
purchaser if the owner allowed the transferor-seller to remain in possession
of the goods. 49 Authorities were divided as to whether the mere negligence of the
owner estopped him-generally it did not.50
In the absence of any actual intent of the owner that the transferor sell the
goods, if the owner knew a sale was likely to occur he was estopped; and recent
decisions hold the owner estopped on the theory that he should have known the
transferor contemplated selling the goods.r1 No court has held the owner to a
duty to inquire as to whether the transferor intends to sell the goods, but de-
cisions in this area support the proposition that the owner will be estopped if
he is grossly negligent. 52 Also, judicial trends indicate that, if the owner was
guilty of gross negligence or laches, he will be estopped even if the transferor's
procurement of the goods was larcenous.53
The purchaser's burden was to prove that he reasonably relied on the appar-
ent authority of the transferor.54 In summary, critical factors here have been
whether the transferor is a dealer in those goods, prior dealings between the
transferor and purchaser, and trade practices. It should be remarked that these
factors are also crucial in determining whether the buyer is a bona fide purchaser,
and courts finding that the buyer is a bona fide purchaser rarely used the doctrine
of lack of reliance on indicia of title to defeat himr 5
UNioRM COMMERCIAL CODE PROVIsIONs
The purpose of the UCC, as stated in UCC 1-202(2) (a), is "to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." The key-
stone provision governing transactions between owner, fraudulent transferors and
purchasers is UCC 2-403, which provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest ac-
quires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction
of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the trans-
49. Foss v. Towne, 98 Vt. 321, 127 A. 294 (1925); R. Benjamin, supra note 4, at 731.
50. Cf. Coveney v. Coveney, 234 Wis. 637, 291 N.W. 818, 824 (1940).
51. Jarbe Oil Co. v. Birdwell & Son Drilling Co., 335 S.W.2d 394 (1960).
52. See Lambert v. Bradley, 73 S.D. 316, 42 N.W.2d 606, 609 (1950); Noxon v. Cock-
burn, 147 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1941).
53. Lakes v. Orley, 240 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1966); cf. Ava Hardware Co. v. Christenson,
122 S.W.2d 92 (1938).
54. See National Fin. Corp. of Cal. v. Stump, 57 Cal. App. 2d 759, 133 P.2d 855
(1943); cf. L.B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Gay, 44 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1950). Of course It is
necessary that the purchaser change his position or suffer injury as a result of this reliance,
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Metropolitan S.P. Corp., 287 N.Y. 857, 39 N.E.2d 309, 31
N.Y.S.2d 659 (1941); Gastin v. Scott, 80 Ga. App. 630, 56 S.E.2d 778 (1949).
55. See Woodward Co-op Elevator Ass'n v. Johnson, 207 Okla 217, 248 P.2d 1002
(1952); cf. Claybrooke W. & G. Co. v. Farmers Co-op W. & G. Co., 260 Ala. 518, 71 So. 2d
88 (Ala. 1954); Speck Cadillac-Olds, Inc. v. Goodwin, 373 Pa. 83, 95 A.2d 191 (1953).
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feror was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the
delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c)
it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the
delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in re-
tention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the
parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the
procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the
goods has been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.56
In construing UCC 2-403, or any other operative section of the Code, it is
crucial to pay close attention to the relevant definitional sections of the Code,
found primarily in UCC 1-201.
The UCC does not mention a bona fide purchaser, but speaks instead of
good faith purchasers for value and buyers in the ordinary course. Neither of
these concepts is equivalent to a bona fide purchaser and the UCC provisions
should now control. The concept of a good faith purchaser for value is applicable
in situations which the common law dealt with by means of the doctrine of
voidable title, i.e., those now controlled by UCC 2-403 (1). The UCC definition
of a purchaser continues the common law definition, which excluded taking by
devise; and a pledgor or lienor, unless specifically excluded, takes by purchase.
57
Goods are also defined as in the common law, but items that are not movable
or could not be considered movable prior to the formation of the sales contract
are excluded. Money is also excluded when treated as a medium of exchange,
and the Code states that title can pass only as to goods which are existing and
identifiable at the time of the transaction. 58 The UCC definition of good faith
offers no great improvement over the common law definition: it includes ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair play and appears to involve
a factual question of honesty in light of the particular circumstances of a case. 59
The concept of value is broadened by the UCC to include the acceptance of
delivery and a binding commitment.
60
The concept of a buyer in the ordinary course is only applicable to en-
trustment transactions, which some courts have treated as an extension of the
common law doctrine of estoppel. 61 The distinction between a good faith pur-
chaser for value and a buyer in the ordinary course is that a buyer in the or-
dinary course is more narrowly circumscribed by having to take from a dealer in
56. UCC § 2-403.
57. Id. §§ 1-201(33), (32); see also id. Comment 32.
58. Id. §§ 2-105(1), (2); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
59. Id. § 1-201(19); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
60. Id. § 1-201(44); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 158, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1967).
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those goods. Official Comment 3 to UCC 2-403 indicates that the definition
of a buyer in the ordinary course is meant to limit the class of persons who may
acquire good title in an entrustment transactions, while at the same time elim-
inating the confusion and injustice that heretofore existed in these situations.
The common law doctrines of "bad check," "cash sale" and fraudulent
transfer are specifically abolished by the UCC. 62 Voidable title is now conferred
on any transferor except a thief, and the status of the title in the hands of the
purchaser now depends on the facts of that specific case rather than any general
doctrine.63 UCC 2-403 does not refer to any authority to sell which the owner
must confer on the transferor, nor does it mention any requirement that the
owner intend to sell the goods. These omissions, viewed in light of the definitions
of entrustment and buyer in the ordinary course, imply that the drafters of the
UCC intended to abolish the doctrines of apparent authority and intent. Of
course, the drafters point out that the UCC in no way limits any right conferred
on the purchaser by prior common or statutory law.
04
Thus, while continuing and clarifying much of the common law, the clear
purpose of the UCC is to make goods more freely transferable by increasing the
protection of purchasers. UCC 2-403 also reflects increased concern for the
consumer-purchaser, as opposed to the merchant-purchaser or seller, which is
most essential to a consumer oriented economy. There can be little doubt that
the burden is now placed on the owner to insure the integrity of the transferor.
But, regardless of the intentions of the drafters of the Code, their efforts are
only successful to the extent courts interpret the UCC with reference to the ex-
panded and revised legal principles set forth therein, as well as current economic
realities. The following discussion is an attempt to assess the extent to which the
Code is working as intended and, where it is not, suggest remedial action. Before
analyzing the judicial treatment the UCC has received, it is necessary to estab-
lish a framework within which the UCC may be applied to various factual
situations.
U1NIox Com2RcmL CODE CAsE LAW
Methodology
UCC 2-403 presents its own methodology for reconciling the interests of
the owner and the interests of the purchaser in goods which have passed by a
fraudulent transfer. This methodology demands a step-by-step analysis as
follows:
(1) It first must be ascertained whether the purchaser is a buyer in the
ordinary course.65
62. UCC §§ 2-403(1)(a-d).
63. Id. § 2-403, Comments 1, 2.
64. Id. § 2-403, Comment 1.
65. Implicit in this methodology is the premise that, by UCC definition, a buyer in the
ordinary course is also a good faith purchaser for value. See Id. §§ 1-201(9), (19), (33),
(44).
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(2) If the purchaser is found to be a buyer in the ordinary course, it must
then be determined whether the transaction between the owner and transferor
falls within the Code definition of entrustment. Where it does fall within this
definition, UCC 2-403 dictates that the purchaser will prevail.
(3) If the purchaser is not a buyer in the ordinary course, or the transaction
is not one of entrustment, the next step is to decide if the purchaser is a good
faith purchaser for value. Should the purchaser not meet this definition, nor the
definition of a buyer in the ordinary course, the owner will prevail because the
UCC only extends protection to good faith purchasers for value and buyers in
the ordinary course.
(4) Where the purchaser is a good faith purchaser for value, it must be
determined whether the transferor has such power to transfer as would enable
him to pass good title under UCC 2-403. Should the transferor not have such
power, i.e., if he is a thief, the owner will be able to recover the goods from the
purchaser.
As the following discussion will indicate, courts have not always followed
this methodology. While in many cases an identical result would have been ob-
tained under the method of analysis set forth above, problems arise from the
fact that the loose analysis in many of these cases may be relied on by future
courts deciding similar cases. The effectiveness of the UCC depends on judicial
construction, and it is desirable that this construction be grounded on a sound
analysis of the factual patterns presented by the cases. Consideration of sev-
eral cases under the UCC will highlight some of these problems.
The Position of the Purchaser
The problems of the UCC purchaser are attenuated by the fact that the
courts have not always distinguished between situations where the definition
of a good faith purchaser for value applies and those where the definition of a
buyer in the ordinary course applies. Thus, purchasers falling within either
definition have been defeated because they did not rely on any paper title or
other evidence of ownership in the transferor.6 6 This was a limitation the com-
mon law placed on the doctrine of estoppel and, accepting the contention that
the UCC definition of entrustment is an extension of estoppel, should at least
not apply to a good faith purchaser for value, because this definition is only
applicable to voidable title situations. The UCC definition of a buyer in the
ordinary course, in UCC 1-201(9), also does not require any reliance on indicia
of title, but rather defines a buyer in the ordinary course as a "person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in the
ordinary course."
An early (1956) Pennsylvania case held that the purchaser would not
66. See, e.g., Kovatch v. Hyde, 47 Luz. L.R. 13 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Luzerne Co.,
Pa. 1956).
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be protected because he did not rely on any indicia of title in the transferor.0 7
The court thought this determination dispositive of the case and did not consider
whether the purchaser might be a good faith purchaser for value or a buyer in
the ordinary course. Ten years later, another Pennsylvania court came to the
same conclusion in a case of entrustment 0 8 This court did distinguish between
a good faith purchaser for value and a buyer in the ordinary course but held
that reliance was necessary in the latter instance. What these courts failed to note
is that UCC 2-403 transcends the notion of reliance and makes the fact of en-
trustment itself sufficient. At most, reliance on such indicia should only be rele-
vant as evidence, introduced by the purchaser, to show that he took without
knowledge and in good faith.
The irrelevance of reliance, as used by the common law, under the UCC
is well illustrated by a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 0
The court held that the purchaser could prevail over the owner, as a good faith
purchaser for value, even though he neither received or requested a title certi-
ficate to an automobile obtained from a fraudulent transferor. Under the com-
mon law, the purchaser's failure to request a title certificate usually would have
defeated him on the theory that he had no evidence of title on which to rely. 0
This decision also underscores the attempt of the Code to modernize commercial
law.71
The common law theory of the purchaser's notice of his transferor's defective
title has also been used by courts, in ways not contemplated by the UCC, to
defeat purchasers.72 This theory has been used despite the fact that neither the
UCC definition of a buyer in the ordinary course nor the definition of a good
faith purchaser for value requires the purchaser to know that the transferor has
the ability to convey good title, but merely requires the purchaser not to know
that the sale to him violates the ownership rights of a third party.73 Thus, as
with reliance on indicia of title, the only relevance the purchaser's knowledge of
the transferor's ability to convey good title should have is as evidence of the
purchaser's good faith.
Nonetheless, two decisions under the UCC have pushed the concept of
notice to the extreme. In DePaulo v. Williams Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., the
purchaser's car was wrecked and towed to the garage of the transferor, who was
also a dealer in new and used cars.74 The transferor then offered to obtain a new
67. Id. For a similar discussion of this case see G. Bogert, W. Britton & W. Hawkland,
supra note 30, at 217-18.
68. DePaulo v. Williams Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 10 Leb. Co. Legal J. 465 (Ct. of
Common Pleas of Lebanon Co., Pa. 1966).
69. Main Investment Co. v. Gisolfi, 203 Pa. Super, 199 A.2d 535 (1964).
70. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. See supra p. 12.
72. DePaulo v. Williams Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 10 Leb. Co. Legal 3. 465 (1966);
Al Maroone Ford v. Mannheim Auto Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 190 (1965),
rev'g 59 Lanc. L. Rev. 291 (1964).
73. See UCC §§ 1-201(9), (19).
74. 10 Leb. Co. Legal 3. 465 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Lebanon Co., Pa. 1966).
COMMENTS
car for the purchaser, who accepted the offer and paid for the car at that time,
although the new car was not yet on the transferor's lot. The transferor obtained
the car from the owner for a worthless check. Upon these facts, the court held
that the owner could reclaim the car from the purchaser. Its decision rested in
part on the theory that, because the transferor did not have the car in his
possession at the time the purchaser paid for it, the purchaser should have been
on notice that the transferor did not have good title.
The lack of possession by the transferor limitation, which is often used in
the same manner as notice, implies that a purchaser should be protected only
when he buys out of inventory. In a second decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recently interpreted Official Comment 2 to UCC 9-307 as authority for
the proposition that the purchaser is protected only when he buys out of in-
ventory.75 However, this comment says only that that section applies primarily
in situations where the purchaser buys out of invent6ry-not exclusively: there
is no authority in the UCC for protecting only a purchaser who buys out of
inventory. Even if it were suggested that this proposition merely gives rise to
an evidentiary presumption that one not buying out of inventory does not take
in good faith, such a presumption would be contrary to both common law and
UCC notions of good faith.
70
Moreover, this proposition would contravene economic realities. In a great
many transactions involving major purchases, such as automobiles, furniture and
appliances, the merchant-seller orders the goods for the purchaser rather than
delivering them out of his own inventory. Insofar as good faith is predicated on
commercial reasonableness, not buying out of inventory certainly would not
show bad faith. Also, these transactions clearly transpire in the ordinary course
of business.
The Code does not require the purchaser to know that his transferor has
good title to the goods, and [UCC 2-403(2) does not even require the purchaser
to know that the transferor is a dealer in those goods. In the absence of such
a requirement, it is a fair inference that the Code imposes an objective standard:
the transferor must appear to a reasonable man to be a dealer in those goods.
The Code definition of a merchant fortifies this contention and clears up a point
of confusion in the common law, but courts have continued to apply a subjective
standard to defeat purchasers who do not know that their transferors are dealers
in those goods.
77
For example, a New York case decided last year involved the fact the
purchaser was a dealer in junk cars and, according to trade practices, should
have known better than to purchase a car from a private individual without
75. Al Maroofie Ford v. Mannheim Auton Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super, 208 A.2d 190
(1965).
76. See UCC § 1-201(19) andsupra note 10 and accompanying text.
77. See supra pp. 5-6. The UCC good faith standard of commercial reasonableness,
found in UCC § 1-201(19), also points to an objective standard.
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receiving any evidence of title.78 The court recognized that the purchaser did not
meet the UCC good faith standard of commercial reasonableness and would not
be protected by UCC 2-403, but went on to hold for the owner on the theory
that the purchaser did not know that the transferor was a dealer in those goods.
This analysis was not only unnecessary to a proper disposition of the case but
threatens to limit the freedom of transferability of goods intended by the UCC.
Regardless of whether the purchaser is a good faith purchaser for value
or a buyer in the ordinary course, he still must give value for the goods. The
UCC 1-201(44) definition of value clarifies the common law definition by the
inclusion of several specific provisions, such as stating that value is "any con-
sideration sufficient to support a simple contract." This emphasizes that the
drafters of the Code did not intend the adequacy of the value to be a relevant
factors as long as some consideration passed to the transferor. They rec-
ognized that in the ordinary course of business both buyers and sellers desire
to enter into transactions most favorable to themselves. This fact, however, is
not always recognized by the courts.
79
In a 1967 Arkansas case, decided under the UCC, goods stipulated to be
worth over $1,000 were sold for $500.80 The court held that although value was
given, the purchaser was not a good faith purchaser for value because the in-
adequacy of the price should have put him on notice that the transaction was
fraudulent. The UCC definition of good faith also does not require that the
value given be equal to what the goods are worth, and even under common law
the value given would have supported a simple contract.81 There is nothing
dishonest about a bargain purchase, and such purchases are clearly within com-
mercially reasonable standards of fair play as evidenced by trade usage.
There are cases, primarily in the area of secured transaction, indicating
that merchant-buyers who take from consumer-sellers, either for cash or by way
of trade-in, would not be protected by UCC 2-403.82 Since consumers are not
in the business of dealing with any kind of goods, a purchaser from a consumer
would not take from a dealer in those goods and would not be protected by UCC
2-403 (2). However, in Article 2 transactions, there is no reason why a merchant-
buyer could not be a good faith purchaser for value from a consumer-seller.
Subject to the good faith limitation, as long as the consumer did not have the
goods on a trial, or on another provisional basis he should be able to convey
good title to a merchant-buyer and cut off the rights of the true owner.
A variety of other types of purchasers have been held not protected by
78. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 158, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1967).
79. Hollis v. Chamberlin, 243 Ark. 201, 419 S.W.2d 116 (1967).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. McFalls, 56 Lanc. L. Rev. 431, 18 Pa.
D. & C. 713 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Lancaster Co. 1959).
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UCC 2-403. A purchaser who buys at a forced auction sale was held not to take
in the ordinary course and did not come within UCC 2-403 (2) . 3 Additionally,
it appeared in that case that the purchaser was not even a good faith purchaser
for value. This holding is consistent with UCC 1-201(22), which defines pur-
chases and embodies the notion that the owner must voluntarily part with his
goods: a forced sale is not voluntary.
Several courts have held that UCC 2-403 does not enable a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to prevail over the owner of the goods.8 4 The fact that he is found not
to meet the definition of a purchaser follows the theory, espoused by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Krativz, that the Federal
Bankruptcy Act makes the trustee a lien creditor and UCC 2-403 (4) refers to
Articles 6 and 9 as the only articles covering a lien creditor's rights.85
The distinction between the common law doctrines of notice and good faith
and the UCC requirement of observing reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing was demonstrated by a 1961 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.80 In that case, both the transferor and purchaser were corporations, and
had interlocking directors, shareholders and employees. The court held that the
UCC good faith concept of commercial reasonableness had been violated. This
holding not only avoids applying the common law doctrine of notice, but rein-
forces the UCC policy of making the result of any case turn primarily on its
circumstances.8
Voidable Title and UCC 2-403(1)
The thrust of UCC 2-403(1) is to limit the applicability of the concept of
void title to instances where the transferor is a thief. The section implies that,
in situations formerly covered by the common law doctrine of voidable title, the
intent of the owner to part with the goods is no longer controlling.8 8 The rule
may be emerging that a good faith purchaser for value acquires good title unless
he takes against the express will of the owner. Several courts interpreting the
UCC, however, have reverted to the common law doctrines specifically abolished
83. National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 223 N.E.2d 515 (1967).
84. See, e.g., Matter of Kline, 49 Berks. LJ. 56 (ED. Pa. 1956); Matter of Kretzer,
48 Berks. L.J. 121 (ED. Pa. 1955). For an excellent discussion of the issues dealt with herein
in relation to bankruptcy, security interests and negotiable instruments, see Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560 (1963), commented on by the
referee in Funk, Trust Receipt v. Warehouse Receipt--Which Prevails When They Cover the
Same Goods?, 19 Bus. Law. 627 (1964).
85. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
86. Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp,, 196 Pa. Super. 182, 173
A.2d 688 (1961).
87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88. UCC § 2-403, Comment 1 states that a good faith purchaser for value is pro-
tected "in a number of specific situations which have been troublesome under prior law."
This trouble stemmed primarily from the fact that, for the purchaser to be protected, the
owner must have intended to part with the goods. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
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by the Code or, while acknowledging this abolition, have construed other pro-
visions of the UCC in such a manner that the purchaser has been defeated in
situations where a proper analysis under the Code would have enabled him to
prevail.89
The major use which courts have made of the common law limitation that
the owner did not intend to part with the goods is in arriving at the common law
result under the cash sale doctrine, which was abolished by the UCC. In DePaulo,
the court pointed out by dicta that no title passed to a purchaser because the
owner did not intend to part with the goods until he received cash for them.0
This language is directly contrary to the UCC 2-403(1) abolition of the cash
sale doctrine and intent limitation. It is also the type of loose analysis that may
have detrimental precedential value.91
UCC 9-307(2), which states that a buyer of consumer goods takes free of
a security interest created by his seller unless the buyer knows the sale to him
is in violation of the terms of that agreement, has been mis-used to defeat a
purchaser for want of a proper application of UCC 2-403.92
The factual pattern of Dunford v. Columbus Auto Auction Sales illustrates
the depth of analysis necessary under the UCC. The transferor, a dealer, had
cars on a floor plan arrangement with the owner.0 3 The transferor then sold a
car to the purchaser, who in turn resold the car to the transferor for a worthless
check. When the car was back in the possession of the transferor, the owner re-
claimed it. Thus, for the purposes of the relevant transaction, the transfer from
the purchaser to the transferor, the purchaser was in the position of an owner
and the transferor in the position of a purchaser under UCC 2-403. Although
UCC 9-307(2) operated to protect the initial purchaser in the first transaction,
it was inoperative as to the second transaction because it speaks of a security
interest created by the seller; and, in this situation, the security interest had been
created by the buyer.
The Dunford court found in favor of the initial purchaser on the theory that
UCC 9-307(2) protected him.9 4 It failed to distinguish between the two trans-
actions and was reluctant to apply UCC 2-403 because that would have neces-
sitated confronting the provision that empowers a person, here the transferor,
who acquires goods for a worthless check to convey them to a good faith pur-
chaser for value. Both the court's reluctance and holding were unnecessary for
89. See, e.g., Cash Loan Co. v. Boser, 149 N.W.2d 605, 34 Wis. 2d 410 (1967). That
court utilized UCC § 9-307(2), which permits a buyer in the ordinary course to take free
of a security interest even though he knows of it. It held that, since the transferor only had
the goods on consignment, no title passed to the buyer. No inquiry was made as to whether
the consignment of goods constitutes entrustment-which it undoubtedly does.
90. Leb. Co. Legal J. 465 (Ct. of Pleas of Lebanon Co., Pa. 1966).
91. For a proper analysis of this issue, see Humphrey Cadillac & Oldsmobile Co. v.
Sevard, 229 N.E.2d 365, 85 Ill. App. 2d 64 (1967).




the reason that the case presented evidence which indicated that neither the
owner nor the transferor could have met the Code standard of good faith.9s
Even courts which hold that a transferor who acquires goods for a bad check
can convey good title to a good faith purchaser for value do so hesitatingly and
appear unwilling to rest their decisions squarely on UCC provisions. In what
usually amounts to dicta, these courts endeavor to set forth common law grounds
for their decisions. 0 The problematic aspect of this procedure is that it makes
it difficult for future courts to ascertain precisely what emphasis prior courts have
placed on the UCC.
For example, where the transferor has automobiles on a floor plan with the
owner, UCC 2-403(2), absent proof that the purchaser is not a buyer in the
ordinary course, should enable the purchaser to prevail as a matter of law.
7
Floor planning is the paradigm of entrustment, and the only inquiry should be as
to the status of the purchaser. Albeit, in such a case the Wisconsin Supreme Court
emphasized that, under the terms of a state statute, the owner's negligence served
to defeat him.98 This type of common law reasoning greatly nullifies the effect of
the UCC. Although UCC 1-103 indicates supplementary common law principles
may be applied where necessary, it is not authority for applying such principles,
in cases where the Code is applicable, instead of applying UCC principles. Com-
mon law principles should be resorted to only where an exhaustive analysis of the
Code does not serve to resolve the issues.
Entrustment
Generally, purchasers have not fared as well under the entrustment pro-
visions of UCC 2-403 (2) as they have under 2-403 (1). Part of the problem in
this area is due to the failure of the courts to properly interpret the definitional
sections of the Code. For instance, UCC 2-104(1), which defines a merchant for
the purposes of Article 2, does not mention the quantum of business a person
must transact to be a merchant but simply defines a merchant as:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker
95. In addition, the owner appeared to claim as a creditor, rather than an owner, and
UCC § 2-403 does not protect creditors.
96. See, e.g., Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 28, 116 N.W.2d 252 (1962),
97. Floor planning is an arrangement whereby most new car dealers acquire their auto-
mobiles from the manufacturer. It is similar to consignment in that the manufacturer re-
tains title to the automobiles until they are sold. Under common law, there was some dispute
whether the manufacturer was bound to convey title to a purchaser even though the
dealer failed to pay the manufacturer for the car. Compare Patterson Motors, Inc. v.
Cortez, 2 Ariz. 298, 408 P.2d 231 (1965) (Purchaser protected under common law.), with
Charles S. Martin Dist. Co. v. Banks, 111 Ga. App. 538, 142 S.E.2d 309 (1965) (Under
UCC purchaser protected as a matter of law.).
98. Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 28, 116 N.W.2d 252 (1962).
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or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge or skill. 99
By this definition, a person who "deals in goods of the kind" only as a sideline
should qualify as a merchant.
In spite of this definition, one of the first cases under the UCC in this area
held that the transferor, who "dabbled in used cars" was not a merchant and
could not convey good title to a buyer in the ordinary course.100 This decision not
only erroneously imposed a quantum of business limitation on the definition of a
merchant but failed to consider the language of UCC 2-104(1) which includes
within the concept of a merchant one who only holds himself out as having skill
or knowledge, and which fortifies the contention that UCC 2-403 contemplates
the use of objective standards. 0 1 Applied under an objective standard, the mea-
sure of the quantum of business a merchant transacts might have some utility in
determining whether the transaction was in the ordinary course of business, i.e.,
in answer to the question of whether a reasonable man would expect to be able
to purchase similar goods from the transferor.
The language of UCC 2-403(3), ". . . any acquiescence in retention of
possession," implies that what the owner does, or does not do, to put the trans-
feror in possession, and what the transferor does to remain in possession, is
irrelevant. Delivery of some nature by the owner and possession by the trans-
feror are the critical factors. The proper construction of UCC 2-403(2), (3) is
that possession of the goods by the transferor represents that he has title to
them.10 2 There is no hint of the common law doctrine of estoppel in such a con-
struction.
A recent New York opinion, however, stated that the UCC concept of en-
trustment is merely an extension of estoppel. 0 3 Thus, according to the court, it
would still be necessary for: (1) the owner to confer some indicia of title on the
transferor-entrustee; (2) for the owner to know that the transferor-entrustee is
a dealer in those goods; and (3) for the purchaser to rely on the transferor's
apparent authority. These requirements are identical to those of the common law
doctrine of estoppel, and this holding, therefore, effectively read UCC 2-403 (2),
(3) out of the UCC.10 4
99. UCC § 2-104(1).
100. Kovatch v. Hyde, 47 Luz. L.R. 13 (1956).
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
102. As the court in Humphrey Cadillac & Oldsmobile Co., Inc. v. Sevard, 229 N.E.2d
365, 85 Ill. App. 2d 64 (1967) pointed out that UCC § 2-403(2) extends the mercantile
theory of transferability, which the common law applied primarily to negotiable instruments
and documents of title, to goods generally. This theory did not depend on any estoppel
but simply upon a representation that title was in the transferor. See generally S. Williston,
supra note 16, at '606-07.
103. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 158, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).
104. See UCC § 2-403, Comment 2, which indicates that the definition of a buyer in
the ordinary course is intended to remove "limitations on the proper protection of buyers
in the. ordinary market" without resulting in either "confusion or ... injustice (such as that
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UCC 2-403 (3) specifically provides that an entrustment will result even if
the procurement of the entrusting was such as to be larcenous under the criminal
law. This, of course, is consistent with UCC 2-403 (1) (d), covering voidable title,
and the general notion of voluntary transfer embodied in UCC 2-403. As the
Florida Supreme Court pointed out, when the owner voluntarily parts with his
goods, even though induced to do so by a criminal act, an entrustment results and
the owner's rights will be lost to a buyer in the ordinary course.10 5 Although this
situation is still distinguished from instances where the transferor is a thief and
no title passes, questions of larcenous fraud should no longer be troublesome to
the courts.
This prediction, however, does not coincide with the decided cases, where,
particularly in instances of conversion, there still appear to be problems concern-
ing the distinction between fraudulent and larcenous transfers. In Linwood
Harvestores v. Cannon, from a rather unclear statement of facts, it appeared the
transferor, who may have been either the agent of a leasing corporation or the
principal corporation, had some authority to deal with the goods.' 1 The extent
of that authority was not ascertainable. The court held that if the purchaser
took directly from the agent he acquired no title, but if he took from the principal
corporation he acquired good title.'0 7 This distinction seemed to be based on the
theory that in the former circumstance the entrustment was criminally induced,
whereas in the latter it was only frauduently induced. It does not rest on the
notion that the agent might have been a thief, which is the only relevant distinc-
tion under UCC 2-403. The court remanded the case with directions to the trial
court to make specific findings of fact on the purchaser's good faith. This is not
relevant to the issue, and the question before the trial court should have been
whether the goods were stolen or merely procured by larcenous fraud.
UCC 2-403(2) should enable a subsequent purchaser, who is able to
establish that he is a buyer in the ordinary course, to prevail over an initial
purchaser-owner who leaves the transferor-seller in possession of the goods; in
fact, it is difficult to think of a clearer example of entrustment. Along with in-
stances of floor planning, such a situation should constitute entrustment as a
matter of law. As UCC 2-403(3) does not set forth any length of time for which
the transferor must be in possession of the goods, it appears that an initial pur-
chaser-owner who leaves goods he has just purchased in possession of the seller-
transferor for even a few minutes would lose them to a subsequent buyer in the
ordinary course. Thus, the burden is placed on the initial purchaser-owner to
insure that any goods which he leaves with his seller will not be resold.
worked by common law doctrines such as apparent authority) to proper dealings in the
normal market."
105. Southeast Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Penguin Foods, Inc., 203 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1967).
106. 427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377 (Pa. 1967).
107. To acquire the goods, it appeared that the agent would have had to forge corporate
documents. The principal corporation would have acquired them by what may be described
as common business fraud.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Notwithstanding this analysis, in a 1967 Arizona case to which the forego-
ing analysis is applicable, the court applied the common law doctrine of laches.'08
The court held that the laches of the owner placed the burden of proof on him
to show why he had not previously asserted his title and remanded the case to
the trial court with instructions to make findings of fact on that issue, rather
than holding for the purchaser under UCC 2-403(2) as a matter of law.
Other courts, while accepting the UCC's position that bare entrustment
gives the transferor power to convey good title to a buyer in the ordinary course,
continue to apply the doctrine of estoppel.' 0 The only mention of estoppel in
the Code simply indicates that the purchaser's rights under estoppel are in no
way diminished by the Code."10
The ease with which the transition from common law principles to UCC
principles can be made was pointed out by the Kentucky Supreme Court over
10 years ago. Prior to passage of the UCC in Kentucky, the court was faced
with a situation where the owner purchased goods from the transferor and later
returned these goods to the transferor for repairs, and the transferor then sold
them to a subsequent purchaser. The court held for the owner on the theory
that he had given the transferor no apparent authority. The court went on to
indicate that, had Kentucky enacted the UCC, they thought UCC 2-403(2)
would require an opposite result. Their construction of that section was correct
in that the retransfer of the goods to the transferor, who was a dealer in those
goods as well as a repairer of them, would have constituted entrustment."' The
court also resolved any theoretical difficulties in relating common law doctrine
to the UCC by pointing out that the requirement that entrustment be to a
merchant who deals in those goods is sufficient to give rise to an implied author-
ity to sell."!2 Although the better theoretical resolution is that the concept of
authority is irrelevant under the UCC and the fact of entrustment alone is suffi-
cient to enable the purchaser to prevail, it is nonetheless regrettable, now that
the UCC is in force in most states, that courts do not always follow this en-
lightened lead.
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
To properly evaluate the manner in which courts apply UCC 2-403 it is
necessary to consider the context in which most of the cases under UCC 2-403,
as well as the prior common law, have arisen. First, by the time the owner and
purchaser have taken their dispute to court, the transferor is usually insolvent,
in jail or in Rio. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the effect of any hold-
108. Lochhead v. GA.C. Fin. Corp. of Camelback, 6 Ariz. App. 539, 434 P.2d 659
(Ariz. 1967).
109. See, e.g., Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 28, 116 N.W.2d 252
(1962).
110. UCC § 2-403, Comment 1.
111. Adkins v. Damron, 324 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1959).
112. Id. On this point see also United States v. Haddi~ & Sons, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 82S
(EMl. Mich. 1967).
COMMENTS
ing in this area is to prevent fraud-the damage has already occurred.11 8 While
it is undeniably sound policy to prevent commercial fraud, this is not the
function of the UCC. Rather, the purpose of the Code is to provide guidelines
for resolving commercial disputes. Any measure of fraud prevention must be
found in the criminal law, Federal Bankruptcy Act, Automobile Title Certificate
Acts, and recording acts." 4
Furthermore, whereas American society previously was economically pro-
duction oriented, today it is economically consumption oriented, i.e., the question
is no longer whether enough can be produced to meet consumer demands but
whether enough can be consumed to meet production demands." 5 It is now
necessary to promote and protect consumption. One has only to note the mass of
advertising with which the consumer is bombarded and the mass of sellers with
which he deals to realize upon whom the burden of insuring the integrity of the
middleman should be placed; it is unrealistic to place it on the consumer. Most
owners, including individual non-merchants, have some type of insurance to
cover the loss of their goods, but few purchasers have insurance to cover losses
incurred due to defective title. 1 6 At any rate, the owner-merchant can pass
any loss of this type along-to the consumer.
An analysis of cases enables one to posit a model UCC 2-403 case."17 An
individual consumer buys major consumer goods for his own use from a mer-
chant-dealer in those goods who in turn is likely to have the goods on consign-
ment, or under some other contractual or financial arrangement, from the manu-
facturer, a distributor or a financing agency. Then, for a number of reasons,
the merchant does not pay the manufacturer for the goods, which he has
already sold to the consumer; and the manufacturer, or his subrogee, attempts
to reclaim the goods from the consumer.
This pictuge belies the sympathy of the common law for the small merchant-
owner who was divested of his goods by fraud. No case has been found under
113. But see Comment, 72 Yale L.J. 1205, 1217-25 (1963).
114. See UCC § 2-403, Conlment 2.
116. Cf. J. Galbraith, The Affluent Sodety ch. X (1958).
116. Even private individuals often have household insurance to cover thefts.
117. The 31 UCC cases analyzed indicate that the parties referred to-in this comment
as owner, transferor and purchaser may be broken down as follows: (Data in percentages)
Owner Transferor Purchaser
Manufacturer or Agent 42







United States Government 4
Additionally, 84% of the transactions dealt with major consumer goods, such as automobiles;
55%, other vehicles and appliances. A sample of 67 recent cases, not decided under the




the UCC in which a consumer-owner was divested of his title by the operation of
UCC 2-403. The only situation in which a consumer-owner might lose title to a
merchant under UCC 2-403(1) would be where one consumer sold goods to
another consumer for a worthless check, and the consumer-buyer then either
traded-in or sold the goods to a merchant, who presumably holds them for re-
sale. Since the result of holding for the merchant in this situation is to promote
the free transfer of goods and consumption, by enabling subsequent purchasers
to freely take from this merchant, there is no reason why the merchant in this
instance should not be protected as any other purchaser.
Given current economic and social conditions, and noting that the UCC
attempts to translate sound economic and social policy into legal principles,
many of the cases discussed herein indicate that UCC 2-403 has always been
successful in this task. This comment has suggested that part of the problem
may lie in the lack of a sound analysis of the UCC. This problem is all the
more perplexing when one considers that the drafters of the Code, through their
comments, have made clear the reasons behind the UCC; but the underlying
reasons of other statutes, which are analyzed much more soundly, are often un-
stated. Due to the recency of the UCC and the fact that its validity can only be
tested by concrete factual situations as evidenced by decided cases, it is crucial
that these cases be subject to critical legal analysis. To the extent such analysis
affirms the validity of the UCC, it may lessen some of the scepticism concerning
the Code or, on the other hand, point toward changes.
Legislation is pending to protect the consumer in a variety of new ways. He
will be protected when borrowing money and purchasing insurance. The consumer
will be assured of better quality meat, fish and poultry, and will be protected
against the hazards of fire, radiation and gas leakage connected with certain
goods. There is also agitation to overturn many cherished common law doc-
trines and grant the consumer greater protection when dealing with real prop-
erty.
11 8
UCC 2-403 ostensibly is already available to protect the consumer's title
to goods. The question remains, does it protect him enough? For instance, why
should not a consumer, who is a good faith purchaser for value, be able to ac-
quire good title from a thief? It is economically sounder for the loss to fall on
the owner-manufacturer or, as is more likely, his insurance company. Even if
the owner is an individual, his interests as a consumer would not be harmed.
DONALD MErRRTT
118. See Schashinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Geo.
LJ. 519 (1966).
